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Abstract
Traditional frameworks for risk assessment do not work well for cloud com-
puting. While recent work has often focussed on the risks faced by firms
adopting or selecting cloud services, there has been little research on how
cloud providers might assess their own services. In this paper, we use an
in-depth review of the extant literature to highlight the weaknesses of tra-
ditional risk assessment frameworks for this task. Using examples, we then
describe a new risk assessment model (CSCCRA) and compare this against
three established approaches. For each approach, we consider its goals, the
risk assessment process, decisions, the scope of the assessment and the way
in which risk is conceptualised. This evaluation points to the need for dy-
namic models specifically designed to evaluate cloud risk. Our suggestions
for future research are aimed at improving the identification, assessment, and
mitigation of inter-dependent cloud risks inherent in a defined supply chain.
Keywords: Cloud computing, Risk assessment, Conceptual model, Cloud
risks, Quantitative and Qualitative assessment, Supply chain
1. Introduction
Cloud computing is a resources management model that enables conve-
nient, on-demand access to a shared pool of computing resources [1]. Cloud
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technology is evolving at a rapid rate while also becoming more ubiquitous.
This ubiquity gives rise to many opportunities but also introduces new risks.
While the cloud model has many economic and functional advantages, the
increased external interactions of its applications have expanded the com-
plexity of cloud architectures and reshaped the backbone of infrastructures
and supply chains [2]. According to a report by ENISA on cloud security, the
benefits of cloud computing, particularly its economies of scale and flexibility
are both a friend and a foe [3]. Cloud users put their most sensitive assets
directly on the Internet, which is why cloud security has become a significant
topic both for research and in practice.
A risk is defined as the effect of uncertainty on objectives [4]; while risk
assessment is the process of identifying, evaluating and prioritising risks [5].
Information security risks lead to a deviation from the expected results for
which security controls were implemented, and they impact the objectives
of the information asset including its financial, safety or productivity goals.
The concept of risk varies in interpretation and significance to organisations.
Therefore, the risk management and risk assessment approach for each or-
ganisation will vary based on their predisposition, in-house expertise, and
risk appetite. Due to their broad applicability, most of the popular risk
assessment and management (RA/RM) frameworks, e.g. ISO/IEC 27005,
ISO/IEC 31000 and NIST 800-30, describe risk assessment at an abstract
level and do not offer sufficient practical guidelines for completing each step.
They introduce a certain level of ambiguity into the interpretation of security
risks making it difficult for them to be used in understanding and assessing
cloud risks, mainly because cloud environments are highly connected, rapidly
changing, and inter-dependent [6]. Being predominantly qualitative or semi-
quantitative, the prevalent use of these traditional frameworks in assessing
cloud risks has further exacerbated the cloud risk assessment challenge.
Cloud risks vary with deployment, and the effect of risk on an organi-
sation is dependent on factors such as data sensitivity, cloud architecture,
and implemented security controls. The responsibilities of each stakeholder
vary with each cloud service model, and the trust among the communicat-
ing parties plays a pivotal role in determining the appropriate risk level of a
cloud application. In multicloud systems (MCS), where cloud architectures
use services from more than one cloud service provider (CSP), the challenge
of risk assessment is evident. While many of the recent research efforts (e.g.,
Busby et al. [7], Cayirci et al. [8], and Islam et al. [9]) have concentrated
on cloud adoption risk assessment, others (e.g., Sendi & Cheriet [10] and
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Sivasubramanian et al. [11]) have followed the traditional route to security
risk assessment, concentrating on the focal organisation, their critical assets,
threats, and likelihood of impact, without paying attention to the supplier
network nor fully understanding its interrelated consequences. This problem
has also been highlighted and evidenced in the works of Johnson [12], Bartol
[13], Boyens et al. [14], Lewis et al. [15] and Motta et al. [16]. Based on the
complexity of cloud service provisioning, there is, therefore, a need for more
research aimed at improving cloud risk assessment.
In this paper, we review the extant literature on risk assessment frame-
works for cloud service provisioning. Our decision to address security risk
assessment from a cloud provider perspective was influenced by the scarcity
of studies in this area, and on the practical need for cloud providers to as-
sess security risks to assure secure cloud delivery to customers. As such, we
also describe our novel quantitative model for cloud providers: Cyber Sup-
ply Chain Cloud Risk Assessment (CSCCRA) [17]. Here we highlight its
strengths, which include its systematic analysis of cloud risks, the visual rep-
resentation of the cloud supply chain, and the assessment of the cybersecurity
posture of cloud suppliers.
Based on a set of defined selection criteria, we identify three conceptual
models developed for assessing cloud service provision risks and systemat-
ically evaluate them against the CSCCRA model. We assess each of the
models based on their goal, risk assessment steps, decisions supported, the
scope of assessment and conceptualisation of risk. Given the scarcity of ini-
tiatives for the practical implementation of a quantitative risk assessment of a
cloud computing service, the CSCCRA model contributes towards improving
the state of the art knowledge around the transparency of the cloud supply
chain, cyber supply chain risks, supply chain mapping and the quantitative
risk assessment of cloud services.
The contributions of this paper are the identification of gaps in cloud risk
assessment, an analysis of current models, and a more detailed presentation
of the proposed CSCCRA model we introduced in [17] which is meant to
address some of the identified gaps. Furthermore, we present directions for
future research by outlining areas where the theory and practice of cloud
provisioning risk assessment can be improved including the application of
dynamic modelling based on defined boundaries and the development of au-
tomated models for the proactive mitigation of cloud risks.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. First, in Section 2, we
present background information on risk assessment and cloud risk assessment
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models. Next, Section 3 examines well-known cloud risk models according to
a set of defined criteria; this also includes a reflection on our own CSCCRA
model. In Section 4, we evaluate the models and discuss our findings; while
in Section 5, we identify several outstanding needs for cloud risk assessment
approaches. This article is concluded in Section 6, where we also present
avenues for future research.
2. Background and Literature Review
2.1. Risk Assessment
Risk Management (RM) is the general process of managing risk to an
acceptable level within an organisation and typically consists of two main
stages known as risk assessment and risk treatment [5]. Risk Assessment
(RA) is a central part of information security management, and it enables
organisations to identify vulnerabilities and threats while also informing the
choice of cost-effective controls (safeguards & countermeasures) to address
potential threats [18]. Ionita [19] describes RA as a structured or semi-
structured approach of analysing the security of a system, identifying weak
spots, and selecting adequate controls.
According to the ISO/IEC 27005:2011 standard [4], risk assessment con-
sists of two processes, Risk Analysis & Risk Evaluation. RA involves a con-
tinuous iterative process which revolves around identifying, analysing, pri-
oritising, mitigating and monitoring security risks. In assessing the risk of
an IT system, several factors are taken into consideration, including iden-
tifying the asset, threat, vulnerability and impact. The objective of a risk
assessment is to understand the existing system and environment and identify
risks through analysis of the information/data collected, which helps organ-
isations to make security decisions consistent with their risk management
strategy, despite the level of uncertainty inherent in the evaluation process
[20]. Risk assessments are conducted to inform decision-makers and support
risk responses, either as part of a security audit, compliance initiative, or to
support security budget decisions [19, 20]. Therefore, in assessing risks, it is
practical to implement a risk assessment framework that employs a rigorous
process in determining the risk factors and promotes increased objectivity
through the use of controlled experimentation. Also, the process followed by
the risk assessment model in evaluating initial risks and informing security
decisions should be repeatable, understandable, and traceable.
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Overall, the main result of a risk assessment exercise is the quantita-
tive or qualitative evaluation of the possible impact of threat sources on a
given system and its vulnerability, while considering the context of such risk
scenarios. This assessment, however comprehensive, does not assure a fully
secure system; instead, it assists organisations in implementing cost-effective
risk treatment processes with the aim of achieving an acceptable level of risk,
which is sometimes referred to as “good enough” security [21].
2.2. Assessing Cloud Risks versus Traditional IT Risks
Thus far, and despite a significant number of scholars who have grappled
with the issue of cloud computing risks, there is currently no industry estab-
lished consensus on assessing cloud risks [9] and no standard measurement
unit for cyber risk [2]. According to ISACA [22], this difficulty is down to the
lack of a structured framework for cloud risk identification and assessment,
coupled with the cloud’s highly dynamic and flexible nature. In the absence
of a standardised risk assessment framework for cloud computing, the indus-
try has continued to use existing IT risk frameworks to address cloud risks
[23, 24]. However, while the cloud faces some of the threats applicable to any
information system, it also faces unique threats and vulnerabilities involving
multiple parties including cloud providers (employees, facilities, systems),
technology (interfaces, API), external attackers and other cloud co-tenants.
Traditional IT risks differ from cloud computing risks. The risk involved
with the migration of internal IT data and applications, or hosting customer
data in the cloud varies according to the sensitivity of the asset, cloud ser-
vice/delivery model, cloud architecture and security controls. Cloud com-
puting leverages many technologies (Service Oriented Architecture, virtuali-
sation, Web 2.0, Internet) and inherits the security risks of these underlying
systems, introducing an extra layer of complexity [25, 26]. The virtual flows
of data through the cloud is layered on top of physical network media such
as fibre optics and other technologies which are old, slower to change and
centripetal in nature [27]. As such, the security concerns associated with the
Internet also threatens the existence of cloud, but in the case of the cloud, the
risk is overwhelmingly high, because of the vulnerabilities of the individual
components, and the co-location of large amounts of valuable data [28, 29].
Interestingly, while some of the cloud risks are as a result of the dynamic
supply chain of the cloud, others are down to the immature offering from
service providers, limited transparency, and the subjective nature of expert
claims [30].
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Furthermore, the traditional IT risk assessment frameworks, e.g.ISO/IEC
27005, which were developed before the evolution of cloud computing, can-
not cater to the complexity or pervasiveness of these dynamic and automated
systems of systems. According to Albakri et al. [31], the most popular risk
assessment standards assume that an organisation’s assets are managed in-
house. These frameworks are structured based on security control domains
[2]. Applying risk assessment frameworks developed with these assumptions
to the cloud, therefore, leads to increased vulnerabilities and inadequate im-
plementation of security controls. Some of the other concerns often raised
about the traditional risk assessment frameworks includes the shortcomings
of periodic assessment, limited knowledge of the Target of Assessment (ToA),
and inability to measure cyber risk in dynamic systems [32, 33, 34].
The process of conducting periodic assessments, naturally assumes that
systems will not significantly change over a short period [35]. Cloud com-
puting exacerbates this issue because a dynamic infrastructure and flexible
links are central to its paradigm. Due to its automated nature, the stream
of interactions between connected systems in the cloud is not always capable
of being scoped and fully characterised a priori. As such, organisations are
increasingly likely to have limited knowledge about their systems and their
interactions with external systems. With cloud services susceptible to in-
creasing exposure to disruptions, especially from the supply chain, it is vital
to assess the risks of any cloud service proactively [36].
Collectively, we maintain that the process of manually fitting the tradi-
tional risk assessment frameworks to address dynamic cloud risks is counter-
productive. Therefore, a more effective approach will be for new cloud risk
frameworks to be built from the ground up to address the various shortcom-
ings of the current risk models, and in the same vein, improve the rigour of
security provisions in the cloud.
2.3. Cloud Risk Assessment Models
Cloud risk assessment is defined as a dynamic, step by step, repeatable
process used to produce an understanding of cloud risks associated with
relinquishing control of data or management of services to an external service
provider [37]. It is considered to be one of the most significant enterprise
security weaknesses worldwide [38]. Tang et al. [39] argue that two significant
problems that have contributed to relatively low turnout of cloud computing
risk assessment research, one of which is the lack of systematic study on the
whole process of cloud assessment. While many studies have been conducted
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to investigate and address cloud consumer risks and issues, the perspective
of the CSPs is rarely discussed in the literature [40].
We define cloud risk assessment model as a tool designed for cloud stake-
holders to assess the risks they face from the adoption, creation or operation
of a particular service. It helps to understand the problem area, analyse vari-
ous risk scenarios, and improve the defensibility of risk result. A cloud model
could be used to evaluate the various background information obtained from
members of the supply chain and other public sources [8]. The application of
a well-founded risk model to cloud assessment ensures that the process follows
a particular methodology and is repeatable, understandable and traceable.
A risk model defines the risk factors to be assessed, and the relationship be-
tween the risk factors, with these factors used as input to determine the risk
level during assessments. Risk factors include vulnerability, impact, threat,
likelihood, probability, exposure factors, and predisposing condition [20].
Some of the advantages of applying a risk model to assessing cloud risks
include the structured and systematic approach to understanding risks, and
the ability to deliver objective and effective decision-making and risk evalu-
ations while saving the stakeholders time and effort as they mature into the
use of the model. Examples of proposed cloud risk assessment models include
SECCRIT [7], CARAM[8], CSPRAM [31], QUIRC [41], OPTIMIS [42] and
SEBCRA[43]. While each of these models addresses risks relating to the pro-
visioning, adoption or migration of cloud resources, we will be concentrating
on models which address cloud provider risks in this study.
3. Conceptual Risk Assessment Models for Cloud Provisioning Risks
A reality of traditional risk assessment methodologies is that they concen-
trate on providing organisations with general principles and guidelines of risk
assessment and may offer fewer details on their implementation. As such the
cloud industry stands to benefit from the development of conceptual mod-
els that address different cloud stakeholder needs. Conceptual models are
tools composed of concepts and relationships, designed to help make sense
of complex issues [44], such as those faced in cloud risk assessment.
Cloud risk assessment requires domain-specific knowledge, and a deep
understanding of the ToA, i.e. cloud service, to ensure one can arrive at rea-
sonable risk estimates [44]. Seeing that a key novelty of cloud computing in
comparison to other IT service is its dynamic supply chain, assessing the risk
of a cloud service requires capturing a snapshot of its shifting landscape. The
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dynamic supply chain, which is an adaptable ecosystem of people, processes,
capital assets, technology and data, enables businesses to strike a balance be-
tween the opportunities that drive economic growth and the downside risks
of disruptive events within the chain [45]. One approach to addressing this
evolving landscape is to ensure that the cloud stakeholders and IT compo-
nents that make up the cloud service are viewed as belonging to the same
socio-technical system.
The current state-of-the-art in cloud risk assessment is presented in the
works of Alturkistani et al. [46], and Drissi & Benhadou [47], where the
authors classified the current cloud risk assessment approaches into five and
seven categories respectively. Our survey work differs from both works in
that, while theirs provides an overview of cloud risk assessment models ap-
plicable to both customers and providers based on the assessment methods
(i.e. quantitative, qualitative, graph analysis, hierarchical etc.), ours provides
greater detail on cloud provisioning risk assessment models. We investigate
models that are targeted at cloud providers to enable them to address the
risks of designing, deploying, configuring, or managing the cloud.
3.1. Selection Method and Result
In this section, we examine a set of established service-driven conceptual
models that can be used by CSPs’ to assess cloud risk. To identify conceptual
models proposed for the assessment of cloud provisioning risks which could
also serve as a reference to the cloud community, we conducted a systematic
review. We adopted a three-staged literature review process similar to that
of Fernandez-Aleman et al. [48]. An overview of the review’s main stages of
our systematic review is presented in Figure 1.
Before beginning the search, we identified the eligibility criteria to include:
1. Articles published in English (CR1)
2. Articles on cloud risk assessment (CR2)
3. Articles proposing cloud risk assessment models for CSPs (CR3)
We considered only peer-reviewed articles, journals and conference pro-
ceeding, and limited our search to well-regarded online databases such as the
IEEE Xplore, SpringerLink, ACM Digital Library, ScienceDirect, Elsevier
and Google Scholar. Due to the nascent nature of cloud provider risk as-
sessment and owing to the limited research in this area of cloud computing,
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Figure 1: Flow Diagram of Inclusion/Exclusion and Literature Analysis Process
we narrowed our search to articles published between 2010 and 2018. The
keywords used in our search criteria included “Cloud service provider risk
assessment” OR “Cloud provider risk assessment” OR “cloud risk model”
OR “Cloud risk assessment”. We explored the title, abstract and keywords
(T+A+K) of identified articles to determine their eligibility. Next, we carried
out a partial or complete reading of the articles that had not been eliminated
in the T+A+K stage, and in some cases scanned the reference list of the ar-
ticles to discover new studies that satisfied our inclusion criteria.
A total of 14 articles were selected for this review. These were derived
as follows. Through our database search using the predefined keywords, we
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were able to identify a total of 307 studies/articles. Of these, 59 were first
excluded as they represented duplicates of existing articles. Next, CR1 was
applied, and all of the 248 articles passed this criterion. The T+A+Ks of the
remaining 248 articles were then examined, and 214 of these were discarded
because they did not meet criterion CR2. While most of them contained
elements of cloud risk assessment, it was not the core area of the study. The
remaining 34 studies were examined in greater detail, based on partial or
full reads of their text. Of the 34 articles, 20 were excluded for not meeting
criterion CR3. Some of the articles excluded in the final phase of the review
included that of Cayirci et al. [8], Islam et al. [9], and Tang & Liu [29]. While
they discussed cloud risk assessment in great detail, they only concentrated
on cloud consumer risks.
In Table 1, we present a cross-section of proposed cloud risk assessment
methods applicable to CSP risks, highlighting their assessment method, use
of experts and evaluation of supply chain. The choice of these criteria for
comparison is based on the existing gaps in the use of traditional risk assess-
ment frameworks to assess cloud risks. The criteria can be further described
as follows:
• Assessment Method – This highlights the risk assessment method
adopted by the model, i.e. Quantitative, Qualitative or Semi-quantitative.
• Cope with Dynamic Cloud – This assess the model’s ability to cope
with assessing the ever-changing risks of the dynamic cloud infrastruc-
ture.
• Risk Value –This identifies the format in which the risk value is pre-
sented to decision-makers, e.g. risk score, risk matrix or monetary
value.
• Use of Experts – This considers whether the model requires the par-
ticipation of external risk experts during the risk assessment exercise.
• Supply Chain Inclusion – This assesses if the model considers the
supply chain in its risk assessment steps, e.g. involving customers or
providers in risk identification and estimation.
With these criteria, we expect to gather key characteristics of each model.
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3.2. Limitations and Gaps
The amount of research into the assessment of cloud provisioning risks
is limited. Examination of the literature relevant to cloud risk assessment
so far has identified that there is more research into cloud consumer risks
[52, 53, 9, 54], compared to cloud provider risks. The lack of studies tar-
geted at assessing cloud service provision risks has also resulted in less agile
cloud environments [55]. While all of the models described in Table 1 were
developed in the cloud era, their principally traditional approach to risk as-
sessment, application of qualitative methods, and the limited knowledge of
the ToA make them unsuitable for measuring cyber risk in dynamic cloud en-
vironments. According to Sendi & Cheriet [10], applying qualitative models
which lack granularity and objectivity to assessing cloud risks is a challeng-
ing undertaking, due to the lack of trust in CSPs and limited visibility of
security control.
Similarly, none of the models presented in Table 1 estimated the value of
a cloud risk in monetary terms, which according to Freund & Jones [56], is
known to promote cost-effective risk mitigation and optimal risk prioritisa-
tion. Also, we see that the majority of the models adopted a silo (traditional)
approach to assessing risks (i.e. limiting the assessment to the focal CSP) [2].
Considering that CSPs rely on a dynamic and complex supply chain, where
the perceived level of the security risk of the cloud service increases with each
additional component integrated into the offering, a supply chain inclusive
approach would be valuable [7, 55]. It would have been fitting for the model
to assist the CSP to understand the vulnerabilities each component supplier
introduces to the cloud service. This remains a gap with provider-based risk
assessment, and in our bid to address it, we proposed the CSCCRA model
[17].
4. Systematic Evaluation of CSCCRA with other Conceptual mod-
els
In this section, we systematically evaluate three other conceptual models
that have been proposed to address cloud service provision risks, comparing
them with the CSCCRA model. To determine which of the models iden-
tified through our literature review in section 3.1 will be most suitable for
this evaluation, we defined two new criteria. First, it was important that
the selected model included information on the parties involved in the de-
velopment, hosting, management, monitoring or use of the cloud services
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(i.e. the supply chain); this criterion was necessary to ensure the selected
models were inclusive in their assessment of cloud provisioning risks and did
not just concentrate on the focal CSP. Second, we were interested comparing
our proposed model with established models that had a good citation record
and their risk assessment approach aligned with information security stan-
dards. Three of the models listed in Table 1 met these criteria and they are
CSPRAM [31], QUIRC [41] and OPTIMIS [42].
To begin our evaluation, we describe the CSCCRA giving details on its
components and risk assessment process. Next, we provide a brief description
of the three other conceptual models. Consequently, we compare each model
with the CSCCRA highlighting their goals, risk assessment process, decisions,
assessment scope, and risk conceptualisation (see Table 8).
4.1. CSCCRA Model
Seeing that the challenge of cloud risk assessment can be summed up as
the application of mental models which are static, narrow and reductionist,
the CSCCRA model adopts a systems thinking approach to assessing cloud
risks [36]. The model takes a multi-disciplinary approach to assessing the
dynamic, evolving and interconnected risks in the cloud, applying different
knowledge areas in the identification, analysis, and evaluation of these risks
[17]. It combines factors such as security, supplier selection, systems think-
ing, decision support systems, quantitative risk modelling, and supply chain
mapping in a multi-stage approach. The structured approach of CSCCRA
allows for a more exhaustive analysis of cloud risk through the identification
of the various components that make up a cloud service and the evaluation
of their impact when assessing the risk of the cloud service. CSCCRA also
enables the risk assessor to focus on critical components of a cloud service
and evaluate them for technology weakness as part of the risk assessment
process.
The CSCCRA model builds on existing risk assessment standards and
guidance documents such as ISO/IEC 27005:2011 [4], NIST 800-30v1 [20],
ISO/IEC 31000:2009 [57] and Factor Analysis of Information Risks (FAIR)
methodology [56, 58]. The model is made up of three components [17]:
1. Cloud Quantitative Risk Analysis (CQRA)
2. Cloud Supplier Security Assessment (CSSA)
3. Cloud Supply Chain Mapping (CSCM)
13
Figure 2: Overview of the CSCCRA Model
The CSCCRA steps for assessing cloud provisioning risks are as follows
and as shown in Figure 2:
1. Decompose the cloud application into its component services and map
out the supply chain.
2. Assess the security of the supplier of each service component using a
multi-criteria decision support system.
3. Identify the weak link(s) within the chain and draw a comprehensive
list of cloud security risks.
4. Stakeholders within the CSP make reasonable estimates of risk factors.
5. Input risk factor estimate to CQRA simulation tool, to arrive at the
risk value in monetary terms.
The primary goal of the CSCCRA model is to be used by CSPs in the iden-
tification, analysis, and evaluation of cloud risks based on the dynamic supply
chain. The CSCM and CSSA tools are to be used by CSPs in conducting
enterprise-wide socio-technical assessments of the cloud services’ supply chain
and in the process, identify suppliers with weak security controls or processes.
The result of these processes provides the CSP with an increased knowledge
of their security weakness and assists them in drawing up a comprehensive
list of risks to the cloud service, which are evaluated quantitatively and the
result presented in dollar value. The visualisation techniques employed in
the CSCCRA simplifies the detection of weak spots within the supply chain
during risk identification, evaluation and prioritisation processes.
The use of the model is not heavily reliant on expert’s experience or in-
tuition. To assess a cloud service, the CSP establishes the context of the
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assessment, which includes identifying the ToA (cloud service), evaluation
criteria, duration of the exercise, and initial security concerns. We now de-
scribe the three main components of the CSCCRA model.
1. Cloud Supply Chain Mapping: Using the CSCM, the risk as-
sessor through the help of the CSP decomposes a cloud service into
its component services (managed by different suppliers), and creates
a comprehensive map of the different tiers of suppliers for the cloud
service, beginning with the Level 1/Tier 1 suppliers. The team gains
an understanding of the cloud service data flow, components and the
list of stakeholders. This process enables the risk assessor to visualise
the cloud service through the lens of its supply chain, identifying its
vulnerabilities, hidden dependencies, and critical suppliers who might
exist as a single point of failure (SPOF). The process of graphically
representing the inherent risk in the supply chain also helps to counter
any documented biases and increases the justifiability of the risk eval-
uation results, making it easy to understand, and provides a basis for
making the risk assessment a transparent and collaborative process.
2. Cloud supplier security assessment: The CSSA allows the CSP
to assess the cybersecurity posture of cloud suppliers. Using the CSSA
tool, the CSP evaluates each supplier’s security posture based on a
combined implementation, effectiveness and impact metric. Being a
Multi-criteria security assessment tool, the CSSA presents a consistent
approach to assessing and comparing cloud suppliers based on 52 se-
curity criteria grouped into nine (9) security target dimensions which
were achieved through Delphi study with cloud experts [55] (see Figure
3). The CSSA tool is based on Dawes’s z-score method of unit-weighted
regression. Our choice of this approach is influenced by the research
of Dawes et al. [59], which showed that the unit (equal) weights of
variables could yield predictions that correlate highly with optimally
weighted composites if the direction (+1 or -1) in which each predictor
is related to the criterion is known.
• Availability of Service (AoS)
• Data & System Hosting (DSH)
• Data Security Controls (DSC)
• Maturity of Security Assessment process (MSA)
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• Maturity of Operational Security (MOS)
• Security Governance and Compliance (SGC)
• Identity and Access Management (IAM)
• Encryption & Key Management (EKM)
• Application Security (AS)
Assessing suppliers based on these security dimensions assist CSPs in
the identification of weak suppliers readily susceptible to a cyber attack
or those with a high risk of failure. Improving the risk assessment
process with this identification of potential weak spots in the supply
chain also helps to capture the vulnerabilities of the cloud service and
promote proactive mitigation of risks.
3. Cloud quantitative risk analysis: The third and final component
of the CSCCRA model is the risk analysis tool. With uncertainty being
a primary factor in risk analysis, the CQRA makes use of a probabilistic
estimate of risk factors, e.g. threat frequency, vulnerability and impact,
and represents stakeholder estimates as a probability distribution (e.g.
PERT, Poisson). We chose to represent experts’ estimate of the prob-
ability of risk and impact factors with the Program Evaluation Review
Technique (PERT) continuous probability distribution because studies
have shown that in situations where there is a lack of real data, it is
safe enough to assume that the variable of interest follows a normal
distribution [56, 60]. Likewise, we adopted the Poisson distribution for
the attack frequency factor, since this distribution expresses the proba-
bility of a given number of events occurring within a fixed time, with a
known average rate, where the occurrence of events are independent of
one another [61]. These estimates are then run through a Monte Carlo
simulation engine using different scenarios to arrive at a reasonable
estimate of the risk. The Monte Carlo simulation is a computerised
mathematical technique that allows people to account for risk in quan-
titative analysis and decision making. It is a stochastic modelling tool
based on a computerised mathematical technique and is used to provide
estimates for complex problems where there are significant uncertainty
[56, 60].
Applying quantitative methods to risk analysis is suitable for the de-
composition of risk into its various risk variables, as it takes away part
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Figure 3: Target security dimensions for assessing cloud suppliers
[55]
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of the subjectivity of the risk estimates. While we are conversant with
the argument against quantitative risk analysis, primarily as relating
to the lack of reliable data, complexity of computation, duration of
exercise and the lack of efficiency [2], we maintain that the quantita-
tive method is more applicable to cloud risk assessment. Its use of a
rigorous data-driven process allows for a deeper understanding of the
inter-connectedness of cloud risks. Furthermore, we argue that the ap-
plication of quantitative simulation to reasoned risk factor estimates
made by a properly calibrated expert team combined with appropri-
ately communicated assumptions will yield realistic risk values [56, 62].
Within the CSCCRA model, stakeholders estimate the values of each of
the risk factors according to their knowledge of the cloud service. Despite the
lack of historical data, the CSCCRA increases the objectivity of expert esti-
mates through the use of controlled experimentation, clearly defined model,
peer reviews and calibration of the experts [56, 62]. Before each assessment,
experts are given a short calibration exercise to prepare them for making
reasoned estimates about the risk factors identified during the assessment.
Factors such as the probability of a threat occurrence are estimated twice
(i.e. with or without security controls), while the estimation of the impact
of a threat source considers different criteria ranging from lost revenue from
operational outages to loss of customer market share, or loss of reputation.
Combining these expert estimates, summarises the accumulated information
and enables the risk assessor to present condensed information to decision-
makers [63].
The application of the CSCCRA model to cloud risk assessment also helps
to decompose cloud risk data into a clear, observable and useful format. Its
quantitative approach also provides a better platform for risk analysts to
defend their result and explain the rationale behind it, thus helping decision
makers to trust the analysis process and its suggestions of risk mitigation
strategies. While the model is currently targeted at cloud service providers
(particularly Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)), its iterative, inclusive and rigor-
ous approach makes it applicable to assessing the risks of many composite
services. Our primary targets are SaaS providers because studies have shown
that at least 80% of a typical SaaS application is made up of assembled parts,
with each component representing a different level of risk [64]. SaaS appli-
cations, therefore, presents an excellent scope for our work, seeing that the
more the components combined to deliver a SaaS service, the supposed in-
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crease in the risk of the service and the higher its dependence on the supply
chain.
4.1.1. Sample Risk Assessment with CSCCRA model
To illustrate the steps of the CSCCRA model, we present an abridged
version of a real-world case study where the model was used to assess the
risk of a SaaS Service. For confidentiality reasons, we refer to the case organ-
isation as CSP-B. CSP-B hosts and manages an asset tracking application
(CSP-B-SaaS) used by organisations to remotely manage the inventory of
their PCs, servers, network and internet-of-things (IoT) devices. In the fol-
lowing steps, we are going to apply the components of the CSCCRA model
in assessing the risks of the SaaS application.
• Step 1 - Supply Chain Mapping: In complying with our assess-
ment framework, we decompose CSP-B-SaaS into its component ser-
vices, while also identifying their suppliers and service category, their
criticality, and the data storage or processing responsibilities of the
supplier (see Table 2). We leveraged technology lookup websites such
as builtwith.com [65] and Google to gather additional data on the lower
tiers of the supply chain, identifying the providers used for the Infras-
tructure hosting, Domain Name System (DNS) and Identity and Access
Management (IAM) etc. The resulting map (see Figure 4) provides a
comprehensive view of the supply chain, which assists CSP-B in assess-
ing the criticality, threat and vulnerabilities of their direct and indirect
suppliers.
Visualising a supply chain helps to detect convergence risks, where a
critical supplier in the second, third or fourth tier could represent a sin-
gle point of failure for multiple components of the cloud service. Figure
4 provides a visualisation of CSP-B-SaaS supply chain and identifies
SPOFs within the chain. One of the suppliers that immediately stands
out is IaaS-Pro-B, the infrastructure provider for CSP-B, who also pro-
vides infrastructure and/or hosts data for all other suppliers involved in
the delivery of CSP-B-SaaS. Here, we see that the use of mapping tools
to illustrate the interdependencies between the components helps to vi-
sualise the cloud information flow and promotes transparency, thereby
assisting CSPs to implement controls proactively.
• Step 2 - Supplier Assessment: Following the supply chain mapping,
the stakeholders appraise the security posture of CSP-B-SaaS’s supply
19
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Figure 4: Supply Chain mapping of CSP-B-SaaS using the CSCM tool
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chain, to identify suppliers who based on their lack of transparency or
limited security control implementation, could be referred to as weak
links. The process facilitates the conduct of comprehensive due dili-
gence on the security controls of the CSP’s suppliers. Assessing the
security processes of suppliers makes the stakeholders investigate their
supplier controls such as personal data encryption, data breaches detec-
tion & communication, data storage and location, and how supplier’s
use of sub-processors impact these controls.
Table 3 presents the participants’ assessment of each supplier’s security
posture. The CSP stakeholders score each component supplier based
on the nine security target dimensions on a scale of 1(least secure) to
10 (most secure). A z-score is calculated for each target dimension, and
the z-scores are summed up in the last column. The z-score (Zi) is a
statistical measurement of a score’s relationship to the mean in a set of
scores. It measures how many standard deviations (σ), a score (yi) is
above or below the population mean (y) [66]. The power of the z-score
lies in the appropriate integration of distinct dimensions weighted to






So, the combined z-score (CZ-score) for a supplier, e.g. IAM-Pro-B,
is a summation of the suppliers’ z-score for each of the nine security





The use of colour and values are considered as suitable methods for
communicating information in a visual framework [67]. The colour in
each of the cells in the last column of Table 3, conveys the degree of risk
that particular component has, comparative to the rest of the chain. A
green cell has the best risk score (least risky), followed by yellow and
then red.
As shown in Table 3, Perf-Mon-Pro-B was assessed to be the weak-
est link in this supply chain, followed by CSP-B themselves, and then
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9 9 7 9 10 10 9 8 9 -0.43
CSP-B 8 7 8 8 8 5 9 8 6 0.63
Code-Repo-
Pro-B
8 9 9 10 9 9 9 8 9 -0.34
IaaS-Pro-B 9 9 9 9 8 10 10 9 8 -0.69
AD-SaaS-
Pro-B
9 9 9 9 9 10 10 9 8 -0.78
IAM-Pro-B 8 6 7 10 9 10 10 9 9 -0.25
Perf-Mon-
Pro-B
9 9 5 7 6 7 7 8 3 1.02
MFA-Pro-B 8 8 8 7 7 7 9 9 6 0.39
Log-Pro-B 8 9 8 8 7 7 8 8 7 0.46
Log-Pro-B. For the performance monitoring provider, they scored low
on data security controls (DSC) and application security (AS), because
they provided limited information on their website on the implemented
controls that assure these factors. Although they provided more in-
formation on their Cloud Security Assurance’s (CSA) Consensus As-
sessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ) self-assessment report [68],
much of the information was referencing the controls in place at their
hosting provider (IaaS-Pro-B). Likewise, Perf-Mon-Pro-B scored the
lowest score for AS, and this was due to the basic level of protection
they had in place for virtual machines and the limited information on
their coding practices, which they claim to be proprietary. CSP-B,
despite their detailed and secure architecture, scored low in security
governance and compliance (SGC), due to their reliance on suppliers
for the compliance of their service. Some other suppliers had traditional
security measures in place, which in the face of changing risk landscape
and growing sophistication of attackers, was judged insufficient.
The need for CSPs to search through online resources and in-house
documentation for supplier controls and processes, and the need for
stakeholders within a CSP organisation to discuss their controls and
identify weak spots are some of the benefits of the supplier assessment
process.
• Step 3 - Risk Identification: In this phase, the participants build
on the results of the supply chain mapping and supplier security assess-
ment, to identify the weak areas the SaaS platform and identify rele-
22
vant vulnerabilities, threats and probable risk events. Table 4 presents
CSP-Bs risk register with the top ten risks identified in the course of the
exercise. The register includes a short description of each risk, the as-
set at risk, suppliers involved, vulnerability, threat agent and type, and
available control. The threat, vulnerability, asset taxonomy complies
with ENISA’s method of structuring risk information [8, 69].
• Step 4 - Risk Factor Estimation: Following the identification of
their top ten cloud risks, CSP-B stakeholders are given a short calibra-
tion exercise on how to estimate risk factors using confidence intervals
(CI). Uncertainty is inherent in the evaluation of risk, due to the imper-
fect or incomplete knowledge of the threat, the ever-increasing discov-
ery of vulnerabilities and the unrecognised dependencies that can lead
to unforeseen impacts [20]. Therefore, for each risk item, the CSCCRA
model expresses the participants’ degree of uncertainty quantitatively
using probability distributions. Each of the factors (Probability with
controls (PwCE), Probability without controls (PwoCE) and Impact
cost) are represented by a PERT distribution, where the assessors are
required to provide estimates to a 90% CI, i.e. lower bound (5%), most
likely, and upper bound (95%) estimate of the factors. A Poisson dis-
tribution is used to represent the frequency (freq) of attack since it
expresses the probability of a given number of events occurring within
a fixed time. Acknowledging our inability to eliminate risks, we settle
for pragmatically reducing uncertainty around risk events and having
enough information to mitigate the top risks.
• Step 5 - Risk Value Calculation: The CQRA tool is used to com-
bine stakeholders’ estimation of the various risk factors and compute
the risk value. The lower bound, most likely and upper bound risk
factor estimates of each of the experts (Exp) is combined as shown in
equations 3 to 6. After which, we generate a discrete distribution based
on each expert’s estimates and the weighting of their opinion, using the
Monte Carlo Simulation tool. As shown in Table 5, we calculated two
sets of risk values, one with controls and the other without controls,
based on the combined stakeholder estimates for each scenario. This
risk value calculation then informs our estimated risk value based on
existing controls. For this case study, the estimated value of the iden-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to 95% percentile of the risk value continuum. The risk value is calcu-
lated based on equations 7 & 8, where ERV WC is the estimated risk
value with controls, and ERV WoC is the estimated risk value without
controls.
ExpnPwCE = RiskPert(LBn,MLn, UBn) (3)
ExpnPwoCE = RiskPert(LBn,MLn, UBn) (4)
ExpnImpact = RiskPert(LBn,MLn, UBn) (5)
ExpnFreq = RiskPoisson(Mean) (6)
ERV WC = Impact ∗ Freq ∗ PwCE (7)
ERV WoC = Impact ∗ Freq ∗ PwoCE (8)
4.1.2. Merits of the CSCCRA model
The structured and systematic approach of the CSCCRA to assessing
cloud provider risks yields objective and defensible risk assessment results.
Its use of the CSCM to identify the components of a cloud service and their
corresponding suppliers helps to present stakeholders with complex supply
chain information using maps. The CSSA component of the model is a sup-
plier rating service, which uses a multi-criteria decision-making method to
rank suppliers cybersecurity posture [70]. The CSSA is designed to bring
transparency to the security risk rating of cloud suppliers, providing a quan-
titative measurement of security performance across the chain, identifying
the inherent risks and comparing suppliers based on their cybersecurity pos-
ture. The risk analysis phase allows multiple stakeholders to participate in
risk identification, estimation and evaluation process and presents cloud risk
values in monetary terms to promote optimum and effective decision-making.
According to Keyun [2], the economic implications of cyber risk have to be
quantified in monetary value for cyber risk management to transform from



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The novelty of the CSCCRA is that it is an effective and efficient cloud
risk assessment framework which provides visibility into the supply chain and
supports comprehensive risk identification, analysis, evaluation and a cost-
benefit analysis for security control implementation. It fills the supply-chain
and uncertainty quantification gaps of both the generic and domain-specific
risk assessment frameworks.
4.2. QUIRC
Saripalli et al. [41] proposed the quantitative risk and impact assessment
framework (QUIRC) model for assessing security risks associated with cloud
computing platforms based on six key security objectives (SO): confidential-
ity, integrity, availability, multiparty trust, mutual auditability and usability.
The proposed model is based on the premise that most of the typical attack
vectors and events, map to one of these six categories. With the model being
semi-quantitative, the authors maintain that their approach enables stake-
holders to comparatively assess the robustness of different cloud offerings in
a defensible manner.
The steps taken to assess cloud risks with QUIRC requires a trained team
to perform risk estimations. The risk assessment process is divided into two
phases: impact assessment and probability assessment. The impact assess-
ment employs a wide-band Delphi method [71] in collecting external experts’
estimate of the impact (I) of a threat to a security objective. This approach is
suggested as a scientific method of ensuring that there is a consensus among
the expert team on the estimate of impact values. Also, due to the lack
of historical data on cloud outages, QUIRC relies on security reports (e.g.
SANS Institute report [72]) in an attempt to evaluate the probability (P ) of
threat events.
QUIRC defines risk as a product of the Probability (Pe) of a security
compromise, i.e. a threat event, e, occurring, and its potential Impact Ie,
where Ie is assigned a value on a numerical scale based on the Federal In-
formation Processing Standards (FIPS) model [73] of Low (1-5), Moderate
(6-10) or High (11-15). The calculation of the risk of an application based on
a single security objective is represented by Rs, which is the average over the








So for example, in assessing the risk of a cloud service, let us assume that
three threat events were identified and they all related to the confidentiality
SO, i.e. cross-site scripting (XSS) attack, malicious access to API keys, and
man-in-the-middle attack. These threats were estimated to have impact (I)
values of 3, 7, 10, and the probability (P ) of their occurrence are 0.08, 0.1,
0.24. Therefore, the risk value for the cloud system under the confidentiality
SO would be [0.08(3) + 0.1(7) + 0.24(10)]/3 or 1.11. Due to the combined
value of risk under the same SO, the confidentiality risk of the cloud service
will be classed as a low risk, seeing that it is far below the maximum potential
risk value of [1.00(10) + 1.00(10) + 1.00(10)]/3 or 10.
Furthermore, the net security risk (R) for the cloud application will be






where the ws for the CIAMAU SOs could have values similar to [0.3, 0.1,
0.1, 0.2, 0.1, 0.2].
In summary, the RA steps identified in the QUIRC model promote com-
munication on risk factors between external experts and internal stakehold-
ers. The model also enables CSPs to consider how identified threats, impact
business objectives. The QUIRC is adaptable, and its use can be extended
beyond cloud computing to other IT and technology industries, where there
is access to subject matter experts (SMEs) and industry-specific knowledge-
base. However, its use of a Delphi method for impact estimation is bound to
slow down the risk assessment process, and the ability of the CSP to adapt to
risks in the dynamic cloud. It is easy to see RA exercises taking over a month
to complete since issues relating to expert consensus, and expert/ stakeholder
availability need to be considered. Also, the QUIRC model fails to consider
the direct and indirect consequences of an impact from their suppliers.
4.3. CSPRAM
In [31], Albakri et al. proposed a security risk assessment method for
cloud computing environments. This framework contains several components
including a cloud service provider risk assessment manager (CSPRAM). It
is designed to be used by CSPs in assessing the security risks in their cloud
computing environment and is complemented by the inclusion of customers’
evaluation of security risk factors [31]. This study addresses the challenge of
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defining the risk criteria according to the organisation’s security objectives
and considering these criteria when evaluating the value of a risk event. The
model also includes cloud customers (CC) in the risk assessment process. The
inclusion of customers is limited to processes that define the security risk fac-
tors, such as asset value, the likelihood of a threat, vulnerability, and impact
of the incident, as well as determining the legal and regulatory framework.
However, the authors maintain that including all CCs can quickly become
unmanageable if all their objectives are included in the risk evaluation.
The CSPRAM model follows the ISO/IEC 27005 standard in defining its
main risk assessment steps. The authors defined risk as a combination of
the likelihood of a threat and the impact of the incident. The framework is
made up of two main parts: The CSP and CC assessments. It attempts to
achieve a balance between the realistic result obtained from the contribution
of the customer, and the complexity of the risk assessment process due to
the inclusion of the CC. The risk analysis phase takes into consideration
the information provided by the CC and CSP’s knowledge of their threats,
vulnerabilities and controls. Subsequently, the CSP determines the risk level
based on the likelihood of the incident scenario and its consequences and
compares the risk levels with the risk evaluation and risk acceptance criteria
set at the beginning of the process, producing a prioritised list of risks.
CSPRAM is designed to assess the risk of a cloud service (particularly
Software-as-a-Service), and it uses a risk analysis matrix for rating risk fac-
tors. The range of both likelihood and business impact are: very low, low,
medium, high, and very high. The combination of likelihood and impact
values is represented on a risk scale that ranges from 0 to 8. The risk scale
is mapped to a simple overall risk rating of LOW (0-2), MEDIUM (3-5), and
HIGH (6-8). For example, using table 6 to assess the risk of a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack disrupting the availability of a cloud service
requires the assessor to estimate the business impact of the threat and the
likelihood of the attack. Estimating the Business impact as a Medium and
the Likelihood of the incident as Low, will give us a Risk value of 3, same as
an event with an impact of Very low, and a Likelihood of High.
Overall, the CSPRAM model promotes trust between the CSP and cus-
tomer based on customer involvement in the RA process. Although, de-
termining which customer to pick for the exercise, and deciding on how to
manage different customer preferences and risks, could lead to the increased
complexity of the cloud hosting infrastructure. The process is also reliant
on customers providing accurate feedback, and could also be slow in adapt-
29
Table 6: CSPRAM Risk Analysis Matrix










Very low 0 1 2 3 4
Low 1 2 3 4 5
Medium 2 3 4 5 6
High 3 4 5 6 7
Very high 4 5 6 7 8
ing to the dynamic changes in the cloud ecosystem. The compliance of the
model with the ISO/IEC 27005 standard helps with the scope and boundary
definition, but its use of a risk matrix in evaluating different risk scenarios
could lead to unprioritised high impact risk events.
4.4. OPTIMIS
Djemame et al. [42] proposed the Service Provider Risk Assessment Tool
(SPRAT) and Infrastructure Provider Risk Assessment Tools (IPRAT) for
cloud service provisioning, and as part of the EU-funded project, OPTIMIS
(Optimized Infrastructure Services). The SPRAT and IPRAT are indepen-
dent parts of the risk assessment framework. The objective of the OPTIMIS
project is to enable an open and dependable cloud service ecosystem, which
provides technological assurances. These should consequently lead to higher
confidence of cloud consumers and promotes the cost-effective and reliable
productivity of CSPs and resourcefulness of Infrastructure Providers (IP).
The framework aims to deliver flexible, auditable, reliable, sustainable, se-
cure and economical cloud services.
The risk assessment process follows a use case scenario to determine which
assets will be involved in the assessment and their interactions. Risks are also
assessed by categories (e.g., technical, legal, policy, and general) to streamline
the mitigation strategies. Using this framework, the different business level
objectives of the SP and IP actors, play a part in deciding the importance of
cloud risk. The model supports the assessment of cloud risks involved in the
outsourcing of a service to an external provider, e.g. infrastructure hosting.
Another decision supported by the model is the evaluations of the reliability
of IP offerings and their ability to meet stipulated SLA. The suggested use-
cases supported by the risk assessment framework include: i) Private cloud,
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Table 7: Presenting a risk event with SPRAT
Risk Category: General
Asset identified Security
Vulnerability of Asset Unprotected password
Threat to the Asset Unrestricted access to data
Resulting risk item Data leaks
Risk Likelihood High (4) [Range 1-5]
Risk Impact High (4) [Range 1-5]
Resulting Risk level
Risk Likelihood * Risk Impact
= 4*4 = 16 [Range 1-25]




ii) Bursting, iii) Multi-Cloud, iv) Federated cloud, and v) Brokerage. Each
risk assessment exercise conducted by the SP will incorporate provider reli-
ability into the risk model, to verify the expected integrity of the provider’s
guarantee when making SLA offer.
The OPTIMIS model defines risk as the combination of the likelihood of
an event occurring, and the negative consequence/impact of the undesirable
event. For each risk event, the assessors estimate the risk level based on
the impact and likelihood of that risk. The likelihood and impact values
are labelled from 1 to 5 according to their intensity (1-very low, 2- low,
3- medium, 4- high, 5-very high), and the resulting risk level ranged from
1-25. In Table 7, we present an example of a cloud risk event involving
the unauthorised access to data due to access to unprotected passwords.
Here, the risk assessors estimate the likelihood of the risk as High, which is
equivalent to a value of 4, and the impact also estimated as High (4). The
resulting risk is a product of the impact and likelihood, which yields a risk
level of 16, with the maximum being 25.
In summary, the OPTIMIS model provides a good foundation for a reli-
able and trustworthy cloud environment, seeing that it involves the infras-
tructure and service provider in the RA process. Using the toolkit, the model
can support the dynamic assessment of cloud provisioning risk. However, its
assessment of cloud risks using use-case scenarios means that any scenario
not identified in the risk identification stage, will not be considered. This
model requires a significant level of transparency between the IP and SP, as
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part of determining the reliability of providers and their ability to meet SLA.
5. Discussion
This study aims to evaluate conceptual cloud risk assessment models, de-
veloped for assessing cloud service provision risks. In Table 8, we compare our
proposed model (CSCCRA) with other selected models (QUIRC, CSPRAM,
and OPTIMIS). Based on the high-level comparisons of the cloud models,
we discuss some of our key findings, emphasising how the models differ, and
the improvements built into the CSCCRA model. As part of the discus-
sion, we also evaluate some of the emerging factors from our description of
the models, including their risk assessment methodology, participating cloud
stakeholders, use of experts, presentation of risk value, evaluation of supply
chain, and the ability of each model to be dynamic.
5.1. Reflecting on Current Models
As one can imagine, the three cloud risk assessment models compared
in this study, are not the only conceptual models available to CSPs. Nev-
ertheless, they were chosen because they were the only ones that met our
criteria as mentioned earlier. The work of Fito et al. [43] stands out as
another suitable alternative, except for their concentration on business level
objectives and the lack of emphasis on security risks in the application of the
SEmi-quantitative BLO-driven Cloud Risk Assessment (SEBCRA) model in
a CSP environment. Some of the excluded papers did not give a practical
example of the model’s application [50, 51], while others did not explicitly
consider the supply chain [10, 11] in their risk assessment process.
While each of the discussed models was developed for assessing cloud
service provisioning risks, they differ in their primary goal and the pro-
cess involved in achieving these goals. We draw particular attention to the
CSPRAM model [31], which identified the need for involving cloud customers
in the risk assessment process. This was based on the understanding that
although the CSP owns the cloud infrastructure and software used to process
data, the data is owned by the CC, and only them can provide a realistic
estimate of the impact cost. CSPRAM authors, however, were cautious not
to involve users in all stages of the assessment to avoid process becoming
unmanageable.
Furthermore, the comparison of the models strengthened the notion of













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in cloud risk assessments [34, 74]. A possible explanation for this approach
is that their proponents are interested in simplifying the model. However
as noted in [20], qualitative approaches can be subjective, and assessments
conducted with such methods may often fail to maintain internal and ex-
ternal consistency with the meanings and proportionality of the values used
for risk estimation. Such assessments will need to include organisationally-
meaningful annotations since their values and meanings are not maintained
across other contexts.
A significant aspect of the models discussed is their use of experts. Of
the four models discussed in this study, only QUIRC actively makes use
of external experts during the impact assessment of cloud risks. Although
the deductive risk modelling approach is valuable to the risk analysis process,
since it relies on experts’ experience, logic, and critical thinking, the QUIRC’s
wide-band Delphi format (which requires a consensus among experts) makes
this model inflexible to address the dynamic cloud risks. Likewise, on the
subject of involving members of the supply chain in the assessment of risks,
both OPTIMIS and CSCCRA involved suppliers of the cloud service, while
CSPRAM involved the customers. Arguments for both approaches can be
made. However, a more significant concern will be for CSPs to consider
data processing and treatment, particularly when in possession of third-party
vendors, given the limited insights CSP’s have about vendor security controls.
We, therefore, conclude that the CSPRAM model would have been more
convincing if the authors had also considered the “upstream” supply chain.
Similarly, considering the flexibility and adaptability of the models to
different cloud scenarios, it would appear that QUIRC is the least flexible.
The main reason for this conclusion is because of its need for Delphi par-
ticipants, which is less adaptable for the cloud. However, the RA approach
described in CSPRAM, which the authors claim will be tested in a public
cloud SaaS application, does not seem to fit that environment. We main-
tain that the approach will be more suited to a private cloud setting, where
the CSP has a working relationship with cloud customers and can rely on
them to be involved in such a rigorous cloud assessment. Lastly, proposing
a risk assessment model without a measure of its capability does not assure
its effectiveness. As such, we commend the implementation of the OPTIMIS
model as a tool and the illustration of its use in the risk assessment of a cloud
service provision.
Given that one of the primary purposes of risk assessment is to prioritise
cloud risks, that is, deciding before a security event which systems are critical
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to cloud operation, and presenting this information to the business owners,
it is only appropriate for the value of risk to be presented in a format that
decision-makers can understand. The CSCCRA model presents decision-
makers with a pictorial representation of their risk landscape and helps them
to identify weak suppliers within the chain. In their review of a dynamic
model, Ghadge et al. [36], maintain that the process of identifying the po-
tential weak spots through the implementation of dynamic models capable of
capturing the vulnerability in the supply chain is beneficial to practitioners
in proactively mitigating the risks. Additionally, while other risk assessment
models ignored uncertainty and its associated challenges to simplify their
decision-making, the CSCCRA explicitly considered uncertainty in its risk
factor estimation, making it an integral part of the model.
Overall, this study has found that conceptual models increase justifiability
by making the inner operations of the risk assessment easier to understand
for both the assessors and external stakeholders. Since cloud risk assessments
often involve internal and external stakeholders with expertise in the different
domain, the best approach to conducting cloud assessments will be to have
all assumptions about the asset and environment documented, to enhance
the justifiability of the risk results and ensure its transparency, repeatability,
and understandability.
5.2. Future Needs
Information security risk in the cloud has remained a cross-cutting con-
cern for cloud consumers and providers, seeing that it integrates other factors
such as trust, transparency, accountability, and cost [75]. The importance
of assessing cloud risks has mainly been motivated by the dynamic context
in which the services and application are implemented. However, the silo
approach of most cloud risk assessment models, where the focus of the as-
sessment is limited to a single environment (focal CSP/customer), instead of
within the context of its supply chain, has been identified as a critical failure
of cloud risk models. Due to the dynamic and rapidly advancing nature of
the cloud, it would seem that our risk assessment practices are failing to keep
pace, creating greater risk exposures. Furthermore, most organisations due
to their resource constraint, fail to conduct due diligence on their third and
fourth party vendors, even though there is an ever-increasing dependence on
these vendors.
We, therefore, anticipate the need for technology-enabled automation and
proactive solutions in addressing the need for continuous risk assessment in
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the cloud [76, 77]. The cloud is amenable to automated risk assessment
and mitigation, where the members of its supply chain can be dynamically
monitored for risk and vulnerabilities within the system and vulnerabilities
can be remediated before getting exploited by attackers. Due to the numer-
ous indirect assets (i.e. assets harmed through the impact on other assets)
involved in the provision of cloud services, CSPs should proactively assess
the risk of dealing with all known suppliers to allow them to identify their
limitations and improve their performance [78, 79]. This approach involves
the application of structural analysis of the cloud environment and the use
of visual structural models to illustrate the interdependencies between the
components and assess the cause and effect relations within the supply chain.
Seeing that the physical boundaries of the cloud supply chain are blurred
due to interconnectedness, the impact of information security risks through
the supply chain is magnified. CSPs are therefore encouraged to dynamically
model their cloud risk assessment process based on defined boundaries, and
proactively monitor this boundary for cyber threats. Automating all or most
aspects of cloud risk assessment allows for repeatable processes which yield
valuable outputs, while also allowing humans to focus on the most significant
risks [77, 80]. This approach also limits the need for external expert judge-
ment on metrics and estimation of risk factors, since experts engagement has
been known to delay the assessment process.
Furthermore, while the causes of cybersecurity incidents may be technical,
their impact directly concerns the business, with links to the reputation and
continued viability of the CSP. Therefore, proposals for cloud risk assessment
models should look towards quantitative risk methodologies to enable them
present cloud risks based on its impact to the business (i.e. loss of business or
cost to recover), factoring the value of the asset into the risk estimations [17,
81]. According to some authors, asset characterisation and valuation, which
should be considered as key components of cloud security risks assessment,
have not been well discussed in the existing frameworks [82]. With this
in mind, we suggest that new cloud models should embrace quantitative
methods in assessing cloud risks with the aim of presenting the value of the
risk as an actual dollar amount or ‘bottom line’, which we believe will be
helpful to decision-makers in evaluating and treating cloud risks.
Lastly, researchers and practitioners within the cloud community should
strive to develop assessment tools targeted at cloud provisioning risks, which
are both useful for science and practice alike, to enable CSPs deal effectively
with the risks involved in the design, deployment, configuration, or opera-
36
tion of the cloud [83]. We anticipate that this will improve the agility, and
reliability of cloud services, helping CSPs to handle predicted and unforeseen
changes, while also assisting them in meeting their SLAs. Also, researchers
should endeavour to implement their proposed models, to measure its ca-
pability and assure its effectiveness in addressing the cloud risk assessment
challenges. The reason for this suggestion is because, to date, many of the
proposed models stay in the prototype realm, and have not been applied to
real-world scenarios [84].
6. Conclusion and Future Work
Security is interrelated with trust, and trust is essential for cloud survival.
The increased dependence on suppliers and the seeming lack of visibility of
CSP security controls have made it difficult for cloud customers to assess
the risk of their cloud services. This inability to conduct a comprehensive
risk assessment has also prevented others from migrating their data to the
cloud and reaping any efficiency benefits. Assessing cloud risks requires us
to proactively identify security risks, up and down the supply chain, and
implement the best safeguards to reduce them. The limitations of the current
risk assessment frameworks, therefore call for a more dynamic and inclusive
approach to cloud risk assessment, one that considers the transparency of
the supply chain, accountability of suppliers, and improves the trust of the
customer.
In this study, we conducted an in-depth review of the extant literature to
identify models proposed for cloud provisioning risk assessment. Using a set
of criteria, we identified and described three of the existing models and later
compared them with our proposed model. We highlighted each models’ goal,
risk assessment steps, decisions, the scope of assessment, and risk concep-
tualisation while also suggesting their applicability and reproducibility. Our
detailed comparison of the models highlighted the strengths, weaknesses, ap-
plicability, and reproducibility of each model. While the findings are based
on our interpretation of each risk assessment model, we believe that the in-
formation presented will enhance the research community’s understanding of
different approaches to modelling and assessing cloud risks.
Furthermore, we found that despite the multiplicity of approaches tar-
geted at addressing cloud risks, there remains a considerable gap in the re-
search of cloud risk assessment models, with emphasis on the inherent risk
in the supply chain. As such, it has become essential for more study to be
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conducted in this area. However, in the meantime, CSPs need to adopt a
more rounded approach to dealing with cloud risks. This new approach ul-
timately requires CSPs to complement the abstract knowledge of risks from
the more traditional frameworks like ISO/IEC 27005, with the specific tech-
nical factors that drive cloud risks, which the lower-level conceptual model
provides.
In conclusion, this study should be seen as a foundation for researchers
looking to build new conceptual models for assessing cloud risks. As for the
CSCCRA model, our future work will see us validate and demonstrate the
suitability of the proposed framework in assisting CSPs to assess the risks of
their cloud service and efficiently mitigate them. We are currently conducting
case studies with SaaS CSPs within the UK to establish the value of the
model with regards to structuring the risk assessment conversation across
the supply chain. The finalised model will also be implemented as part of a
cloud risk assessment web-based application.
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